Douglas DC-10

Federal Express - FedEx

On October 28, 2016, about 1751 eastern daylight time, FedEx Express (FedEx) flight 910, a McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F, N370FE, experienced a left main landing gear (MLG) collapse after landing on runway 10L at Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and the left wing subsequently caught fire. The airplane came to rest off the left side of the runway. The two flight crew members evacuated the airplane. The captain reported a minor cut and abrasions from the evacuation, and the first officer was not injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The cargo flight was operating on an instrument flight plan under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 121 and originated at Memphis International Airport (KMEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. Both flight crew members stated in post accident interviews that the departure from MEM and the en route portion of the flight were normal. About 1745, air traffic control (ATC) cleared the flight for final approach to the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 10L at KFLL. Recorder data indicate that the first officer set the flaps at 35º about 1746 when the airplane was 3,000 ft above ground level (agl). The first officer disconnected the autopilot about 1749 when the airplane was 1,000 ft agl. Both flight crew members reported that the approach was stable at 500 ft agl. At 200 ft agl, the first officer began making airspeed corrections to compensate for the crosswind. About 1750, the first officer disconnected the autothrottles, as briefed, when the airplane was at 100 ft agl. At 50 ft agl, the first officer initiated the flare. The left MLG touched down about 1750:31 in the touchdown zone and left of the runway centerline. The first officer deployed the spoilers at 1750:34, and the nose gear touched down 3 seconds later. The thrust reversers were deployed at 1750:40. According to cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, the captain instructed the first officer to begin braking about 1750:39 (the airplane was not equipped with autobrakes). FDR data indicate an increase in brake pedal position angle and increase in longitudinal deceleration (indicating braking) about 1750:41. In post accident interviews, the flight crew members reported hearing a "bang" as the first officer applied the brakes, and the airplane yawed to the left. About this time, the CVR recorded the sound of multiple thuds, consistent with the sound of a gear collapse. About 1750:48, the captain stated, "I have the airplane," and the first officer replied, "you got the airplane." The captain applied full right rudder without effect while the first officer continued braking. About 1750:53, the captain instructed the first officer to call and inform the tower about the emergency. An airport video of the landing showed that the No. 1 engine was initially supporting the airplane after the left MLG collapse when a fire began near the left-wing tip. The airplane eventually stopped off the left side of runway 10L, about 30º to 40º off the runway heading. About 1751, the flight crew began executing the evacuation checklist. The pilots reported that, as they were about to evacuate, they heard an explosion. The airport video showed a fireball erupted at the No. 1 engine. The captain attempted to discharge a fire bottle in the No. 1 engine, but it didn't discharge. They evacuated the airplane through the right cockpit window.

World Airways

The flight was conducting a straight-in approach during visual meteorological conditions. The approach was backed up by an ILS and was stable at 500 feet above touchdown. The initial touchdown was firm and main landing gear rebounded, possibly bouncing slightly off the runway. Control column input and possibly momentum from the touchdown resulted in a rapid pitch down and hard nose gear impact with the runway. Wing spoilers likely did not deploy due to the main gear bounce and/or throttle position. Following the nose gear impact, the airplane pitched up as expected and the column was held in a slightly forward position. Airspeed rapidly decayed, and engine power began to increase as the airplane pitch reversed to a downward motion for a second time. One of the crew, likely the FO, called “flare flare” and the column recorded a rapid nose up input, followed by a rapid nose down input, and the nose gear again struck the runway very hard, likely causing the majority of the damage at that point. Following the second nose gear impact, column inputs stabilized at a slightly nose up command, power was set on all three engines, and the go-around was successfully executed. A slight lag in the power increase on engine number 3 may have contributed to the nose down motion leading to the second nose gear impact, although the large forward (airplane nose down) column movement appears to be a much more significant contributor. It is unclear why the engine was slower to increase. Throttle lever angle was not recorded, but the engine operated as expected for all other phases of the flight, including after the impact, therefore it is possible the pilot did not advance the number 3 throttle concurrently with the others. The captain’s flight and duty schedule complied with Federal Aviation regulations, but he experienced a demanding 10-day trip schedule prior to the incident involving multiple time zone crossings and several long duty periods, and reported difficulties sleeping prior to the accident leg. The captain was likely further affected by a digestive system upset during the accident flight. It is likely that the captain’s performance was degraded by fatigue and some degree of physical discomfort brought on by a short-term illness. The captain had recently completed upgrade training to DC-10, having previously been flying as an MD-11 first officer. The training program was fragmented over approximately ten months, and while in accordance with FAA regulations, may have adversely affected his consolidation of skills and experience.

Federal Express - FedEx

The approach and landing were stabilized and within specified limits. Recorded data indicates that the loads experienced by the landing gear at touchdown were within the certification limits for an intact landing gear without any pre-existing cracks or flaws. The weather and runway conditions did not affect the landing. The application of braking by the accident crew, and the overall effect of the carbon brake modification did not initiate or contribute to the landing gear fracture. Post-accident modifications to the MD-10 carbon brake system were implemented due to investigative findings for the purposes of braking effectiveness and reliability. Post accident emergency response by the flight crew and ARFF was timely and correct. The left main landing gear (LMLG) outer cylinder on the accident airplane had been operated about 8 ½ years since its last overhaul where stray nickel plating likely was introduced in the air filler valve hole. Nickel plating is a permissible procedure for maintaining the tolerances of the inner diameter of the outer gear cylinder, however the plating is not allowed in the air filler valve bore hole. Literature and test research revealed that a nickel plating thickness of 0.008" results in a stress factor increase of 35%. At some point in the life of the LMLG, there was a load event that compressively yielded the material in the vicinity of the air filler valve hole causing a residual tension stress. During normal operations the stress levels in the air filler valve hole were likely within the design envelope, but the addition of the residual stress and the stress intensity factor due to the nickel increased these to a level high enough to initiate and grow a fatigue crack on each side of the air filler valve hole. The stresses at the air filler valve hole were examined via development of a Finite Element Model (FEM) which was validated with data gathered from an instrumented in-service FedEx MD-10 airplane. The in-service data and FEM showed that for all of the conditions, the stress in the air filler valve hole was much higher than anticipated in the design of the outer cylinder. Fatigue analysis of the in service findings and using the nickel plating factor resulted in a significantly reduced fatigue life of the gear cylinder compared with the certification limits. During the accident landing the spring back loads on the LMLG were sufficient to produce a stress level in the air filler valve hole that exceeded the residual strength of the material with the fatigue cracks present.

Arrow Air

The aircraft departed Miami-Intl Airport on a night cargo flight to Managua, carrying three crew members and a load consisting of 50 tons of chemical and toxic products. After touchdown on runway 09 which is 2,450 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through a fence, lost its nose gear and came to rest 350 metres further in trees. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Biman Bangladesh Airlines

The aircraft departed Dubai on a flight to Dhaka with an intermediate stop in Chittagong, carrying 201 passengers and a crew of 15. Weather conditions at Chittagong Airport were poor with a visibility of 1,800 metres in rain, 5-7 oktas cloud at 700 feet, 3-4 oktas cloud at 1,300 feet, 0-2 oktas cloud at 2,600 feet, overcast at 8,000 feet with CB's, temporary visibility of 2 km and wind from 180 at 6 knots. On final approach, the aircraft was unstable but the captain decided to continue the descent. After touchdown on runway 23, the aircraft deviated from the centerline to the right, causing the right main gear to veer off runway. While contacting soft ground, it was torn off, causing the engine n°3 to be partially sheared off. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest in a grassy area along the runway. All 216 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Centurion Air Cargo

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Miami-Intl Airport on behalf of Lineas Aéreas Suramericanas, the crew started a night approach to Bogotá-El Dorado Airport. On final, the aircraft was unstable and too low when the GPWS alarm sounded five times. The captain increased engine power and elected to gain height, causing the aircraft to continue over the glide. At an excessive speed of 180 knots, the aircraft landed 1,500 feet past the runway 13L threshold (runway 13L is 3,800 metres long). After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure but unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran. It lost its undercarriage, collided with the ILS equipment, lost both engines n°1 and 3 and eventually came to rest few hundred metres further in a grassy area. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Federal Express - FedEx

On December 18, 2003, about 1226 central standard time, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) flight 647, a Boeing MD-10-10F (MD-10), N364FE, crashed while landing at Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The right main landing gear collapsed after touchdown on runway 36R, and the airplane veered off the right side of the runway. After the gear collapsed, a fire developed on the right side of the airplane. Of the two flight crewmembers and five non revenue FedEx pilots on board the airplane, the first officer and one non revenue pilot received minor injuries during the evacuation. The post crash fire destroyed the airplaneís right wing and portions of the right side of the fuselage. Flight 647 departed from Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (OAK), Oakland, California, about 0832 (0632 Pacific standard time) and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

DAS Air Cargo - Dairo Air Services

The aircraft departed London-Gatwick Airport on a cargo flight to Entebbe, carrying seven crew members and a load of 50 tons of various goods. After landing by night on runway 17, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 17/35 is 12,000 feet long), overran and plunged in the Lake Victoria. The aircraft broke in two and all seven crew members were rescued 10 minutes later.

AOM French Airlines

Leased from AOM French Airlines, the aircraft was completing a charter flight (service CU1216) from Havana to Guatemala City on behalf of Cubana de Aviacion, carrying 18 crew members and 296 passengers who were mostly young Guatemalan citizens studying medicine in Cuba. After touchdown on runway 19, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went down an embankment and eventually crashed onto several houses located in the district of La Libertad. Both pilots, six other crew members, eight passengers and two people on the ground were killed. Also, 57 people were injured (among them 20 on the ground) while 261 other occupants escaped uninjured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Federal Express - FedEx

The airplane was at FL 330 when the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to Newburgh/Stewart International Airport and landed. The airplane was destroyed by fire after landing. The fire had burned for about 4 hours after after smoke was first detected. Investigation revealed that the deepest and most severe heat and fire damage occurred in and around container 06R, which contained a DNA synthesizer containing flammable liquids. More of 06R's structure was consumed than of any other container, and it was the only container that exhibited severe floor damage. Further, 06R was the only container to exhibit heat damage on its bottom surface, and the area below container 06R showed the most extensive evidence of scorching of the composite flooring material. However, there was insufficient reliable evidence to reach a conclusion as to where the fire originated. The presence of flammable chemicals in the DNA synthesizer was wholly unintended and unknown to the preparer of the package and shipper. The captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to call for checklists or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required checklist items. The Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations do not adequately address the need for hazardous materials information on file at a carrier to be quickly retrievable in a format useful to emergency responders.